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Several publications and recent reports have chronicled John Marshall’s decisive place in 
communication history. Reports by Buxton,
1
 Kridel,
2
 and Tobias,
3
 have examined the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s (RF) crucial role in the formation of educational media in the 1930s, 
which has included the study and basis of media effects research. As this report will show, 
Rockefeller initiatives in the 1930s also served as an essential foundation for the development of 
American educational broadcasting, the precursor to public broadcasting. The RF archives reveal 
that the origin of noncommercial broadcasting methods and organization commenced as an 
advocacy response to the Communications Act of 1934, which privatized radio frequency 
allocations. Experiments between 1934 and 1940 were designed to determine the most effective 
spatial organization for a non-profit approach to broadcasting. Ultimately educational proponents 
settled on a national model, influenced by the success of and the Office of Education’s Federal 
Radio Education Committee suggestions. Underwritten by the RF, the Office of Education 
developed models for curricular standards and streamlined communications technology 
administration and distribution adapted by National Educational Television and Radio in the 
1950s.  
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Passed in 1934, the Communications Act stipulated that frequency delegations best 
served “public interest” in private hands because commercial broadcasters offered the most 
opportunities for program availability.
4
 Consequent commercial allocations by the FCC 
decimated a decentralized educational radio experiment largely based in Midwestern colleges 
and land-grant universities, but the policy also provided clear contours for future institutional 
development. Previous to 1934, hundreds of universities had used radio to extend distance 
learning initiatives to reach urban and agrarian audiences. The quality and efficiency of these 
experiments varied widely. Though a few land-grant institutions in the Midwest had produced 
quality programming, by and large, most stations remained undeveloped and with little 
understanding of how to utilize the radio medium.
5
 While early practitioners had begun to 
develop methods for electronic distance learning, there had been little research or investment of 
how to implement technology effectively for curricular purposes, and many universities 
subsequently cut funding to campus radio stations or abandoned radio entirely.  
After 1934 educational advocates were joined by two influential organizations that 
increased the quality and diversity of experimentation: The RF and the federal Office of 
Education (OOE), especially Commissioner John Studebaker, who also oversaw the Federal 
Radio Education (FREC). These institutions, driven by a belief in technology’s capacity to offer 
universal public education, became staunch advocates for educational radio, and together they 
sought to build scaffolding for a noncommercial broadcasting system that would have to survive 
with significantly less funds, frequency allocations, and professional-quality practitioners than 
would commercial network broadcasters.
6
 In consistent contact, between 1934 and 1940, these 
two organizations determined that the most important issue facing educational broadcasters was 
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the need to develop a sustainable administrative construct to organize into a stable alternative to 
commercial broadcasting.
7
  
Calling upon a progressive-era vision for educational technology, in total, John Marshall 
underwrote four large-scale spatial experiments over six years: local, regional, national, and 
international, (the World Wide Broadcasting Federation, already covered by William Buxton’s 
report) with funding allocated based on several criteria:  
1) How do we best provide local populations with free access to public education? 
2) What types of programming would best attract local audiences?  
3) What methods would gain the most support from local civic agencies and 
governmental institutions?  
This conclusion of this period of experimentation resulted in a consensus that the Office of 
Education had provided the best administrative example for educational broadcasting. This 
research report centers on the three U.S.-based experiments under consideration in the 1930s, as 
chronicled in the RF archives.  
 
The Serendipity of the Humanities Project for Radio Experimentation 
How did the Rockefeller Foundation come to fund early educational broadcasting and 
communication research? In a 1933 report the RF trustees endeavored to underwrite projects 
responsible for “bringing the humanities from books, seminars, and museums into the current of 
modern life.”8 The committee was concerned that funding, up until that point, centered too 
strongly on non-applied research as a “sole method”9 of cultural uplift. Funding research on 
historical humanities alone, they worried, might miss the target of stimulating new humanities 
movements and methods. Hence, just previous to the Communications Act of 1934, the RF had 
begun to search for “direct ways of extending the area of public appreciation [that] called for 
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assistance from persons with intimate knowledge of the ways in which the American public now 
gains its culture.”10 They settled on the relatively consistent yet still-developing domains of 
broadcasting, motion picture, and museum culture, as potential sites for stimulating intellectual 
and civic motivation. Due to the media’s ability to reach larger target demographics with 
immediacy, as well as its unusual capacity to influence opinion and cultural knowledge through 
content practices, technology was a logical choice for new investment. The RF trustees 
commissioned investigative reports to explore possible lines of inquiry.  
Working under David H. Stevens, a professor from the University of Chicago, who ran 
the Division of Humanities until 1949, John Marshall would repeatedly make uncannily astute 
research grants that prognosticated many of the foundations of media research and practice. 
Marshall pulled from progressive conceptual bases to select practitioners and researchers, 
especially Stevens’ vision. In The Humanities in Theory and Practice, Stevens wrote that the 
function of the humanities was to make “the individual a citizen of the world in matters of the 
spirit—to create within him his own forms of mental, emotional, and spiritual freedom.”11 This 
could be accomplished, he posited, by recreating imagination “beyond the ordinary”12 via the 
transmission of values, meanings, and critical informed research. Stevens’ conclusion was that 
the humanities could expand the teaching of the arts by spreading “public appreciation”13 to the 
widest net of reception, via radio, film, drama, libraries, and museums. The aim of the project 
was to preserve and develop American cultural traditions, promote cultural understanding among 
nations, and continue with obligations from previous programs in philosophy and education. At 
the program’s inception Marshall believed the best way to achieve this would be to disseminate 
and chronicle “regional life,”14 in which Native American, urban, and southern experiences 
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could be accumulated and curated through recording, and then spread as wide repositories of 
knowledge that would be available at universities.  
Due to an invitation to a conference on educational broadcasting by the FCC and the 
Office of Education in 1934, Marshall realized an opportunity to improve a still-fledgling 
approach to pedagogy and culture via radio. His initially focused interest in radio was soon 
expended to the question of new media in general, and by 1935 the RF had secured fifteen 
written reports that highlighted new methods and techniques surrounding international education 
and mediated communication.
15
 Among recommended initiatives included methods of radio 
broadcasting. While the radio spectrum had been delegated to the centralized, national model of 
NBC and CBS in 1934, the RF noted that educational broadcasting provided the widest and most 
opportune counterpoint to commercial broadcasting to “render invaluable intermediary service”16 
to a listening public. In alignment with the RF’s initial vision, land grant based institutions had  
been the sole group dedicated to the use of radio for cultural localism. However, since radio had 
been inscribed as an almost exclusively non-public domain, Marshall noted that cooperative 
endeavors between commercial and educational interests would be necessary for the purpose of 
expanding public access to media, and he sought a way to encourage the noncommercial sector 
and its potential to serve civic interest.  
The RF’s relationship with the burgeoning educational movement turned out to be crucial 
for the development of public broadcasting. Both Marshall and his grant receivers were 
interested in evaluating radio for the purpose of extending educational initiatives and civic 
participation through new media. Since educational radio practitioners were often trained 
academic researchers, investment by the RF immediately led to several focused projects on how 
to improve the use of radio for education, most famously the Princeton Radio Project (PRP). 
6 
 
While Marshall began with the question of how to realize radio’s cultural potential for 
distributing American folklore and minority representation, the basic issue of how to disseminate 
cultural information quickly turned out to be the most pressing problem. On top of the well-
chronicled communications methods devised by the PRP, correspondence shows that proponents 
hoped to address methods of delivery of noncommercial content (such as regional folklore) to 
diverse and remote publics.   
To begin the “spread”17 of appreciation of American cultural experience, Marshall looked 
to methods of personnel training as a first step. Previous to the Communications Act educators 
had failed to institutionalize a rigorous program of best practices and broadcast aesthetics—two 
standards that commercial broadcasters had streamlined. With the FREC Marshall paired 
researchers, networks, and the fledgling noncommercial practitioners to improve educational 
broadcasting toward the stated regulatory stipulation of promoting public interest. The “New 
Program” in the humanities consequently approved seven initial programs on April 10, 1935, 
totaling $112,500, to fund every exploration of broadcasting organization to see which would 
work best.
18
  
 
Localism—The University Broadcasting Council of Chicago 
In 1935 John Marshall received an application for a Chicago-based educational 
broadcasting consortium. According to the application by the University Broadcasting Council 
(UBC), based out of the University of Chicago (UC), Chicago provided an unusually rich terrain 
for cross-institutional collaboration for noncommercial broadcasting with local universities, 
museums, researchers, and commercial interests all dedicated to its improvement.
19
 The UBC 
was headed by Allen Miller, who had served as head of the Radio Department at the University 
of Chicago. He intended to develop “radio programs of cultural and educational value to 
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strengthen the development of a regional center to promote cooperation between radio stations 
and educational institutions in the Chicago area.”20 Applying for $64,500 to cover salaries and 
telephone line rental, UC, Northwestern, and DePaul intended to create a board of trustees that 
consisted of two representatives from each participating university. The Council planned to 
coordinate, develop, schedule, and broadcast radio programs of an educational nature from a 
central office in the Loop district of Chicago. As an attempt to institute a rigorous form of 
educational localism, in which a cosmopolitan center provided an opportunity for top researchers 
to produce new administrative and aesthetic forms, the UBC was an attractive experiment for 
Marshall. 
 Marshall strongly supported the project, based upon a piece written by Miller titled “The 
Problem of Educational Broadcasting and a Plan for Its Solution,” in which he described 
educational broadcasting’s problems, but also envisioned the promising capacity of radio to 
reach wide urban audiences. Due to “increased complexity and variability of modern society,” 
Miller argued that continuing education “throughout life” had become a need of paramount 
importance.
21
 Radio held the unique potential to be the most economical and powerful media for 
dissemination of information and education to a large and widely scattered adult audience. The 
UBC, Miller argued, would be an excellent test for educators to consolidate intellectual talent 
within close proximity to address an already built-in audience. A recent study of Chicago had 
shown that nearly fifty percent of all radio listening homes followed University of Chicago radio 
features at some point in the week, amounting to nearly 250,000 potential listeners.
22
  
Such an experiment based out of a large diverse city such as Chicago would address the 
basic problem facing educational radio: only a small fraction of educational radio’s potential had 
been realized, as educators had previously been “ignorant” of the problems and techniques that 
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would make curricular broadcasting viable. Professors had lacked sufficient knowledge of the 
standards of education and the radio as an apparatus. Stations had relied too strongly upon a 
professor-class of broadcasters, but wider audiences held little interest in listening based upon 
expertise alone. Noting that the strengths of personality and technical ability seemed to be “far 
more important considerations in educational broadcasting than academic reputations”23 to a 
wide audience, Marshall hoped that radio could develop new instructional techniques reflective 
of commercial aesthetics, such as high content value, as a method for the improvement of 
curricular reception.  
Yet, the conundrum they faced was that while a more populist/aesthetic approach was 
favorable, the goal was for educational radio to meet standard criteria. It was crucial that 
educational broadcasting remained in the domain of educators. Having such a large and attentive 
population would provide for quick input on improvement. The University Broadcasting Council 
planned to create a centralized infrastructure in a heterogeneous environment in which localized 
experts would have easy access to other experts. Marshall believed that such cooperation could 
quickly streamline project errors on a step-by-step basis. Further, such an arrangement would 
reduce costs, increase programming for an urban community, insure scheduling so that hours of 
rented time would be covered, increase efficiency, and insure that the politics of liberal education 
were observed. Chicago also was unique in that it offered wide access to radio affiliates of NBC 
and CBS, as well as the “superstation” independent WGN.  
 As head of the project, Allen Miller proved to be an aggressive and competent director. 
In line with Marshall’s intent, Miller commenced a study directed at how commercial 
broadcasting arranged and organized their institutions as a model for the UBC. Miller traveled to 
Washington and New York to a positive reception from Merlin Aylesworth of NBC, Fred Willis 
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of CBS, and Phil Loucks of the National Association of Broadcasters. Aylesworth was impressed 
enough that he agreed to introduce the UBC project to the NBC board to assist with the training 
of educators.
24
 This led to the participation of Judith Waller, who was the educational director 
for NBC in Chicago. Miller further gained collaborative support of other educational institutions 
such as the Field Museum, the Museum of Science and Industry, the Chicago Public Library, and 
the American Medical Association. Within a short period of time an impressive consortium had 
been constituted that was able to take advantage of the best in education and commercial 
methods in the Chicago area.  
Yet, however promising such widespread support from major institutions initially 
appeared, Miller was not provided with as good a working cooperative as he and Marshall had 
hoped. Viewed as a peripheral experiment to the classroom instead of a sustainable project, 
administrators at the major universities were unwilling to allow faculty course remissions to 
concentrate on programming and development. Worse for Allen, faculty had little understanding 
or interest in learning the sophisticated economies of scale that sustained media industry 
production. Quality programming by academics with no prior experience proved to be a nearly 
impossible task, and a series of documents point to the difficulty of coordinating simple activities 
such as auditions for on-air talent or reviewing scripts.
25
 These problems were further 
exacerbated by a lack of consistent talent available in rotation for educational broadcasts. 
Anecdotally, one musical education show run by a local school district had the problem of being 
staffed by hosts and an engineer prone to technical flaws and resistance to the stated educational 
goals of the initiative, reportedly calling recommended pedagogical techniques “high falutin’ 
notions,”26 and Miller had no replacement on hand for the hosts so the show continued.  
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In his assessment Miller wrote that such problems were helpful for improving the UBC’s 
overall awareness of best practices in radio broadcasting, and by the end of the Council’s first 
two-year experiment, both Miller and Marshall had felt that they made some limited progress. 
The first year was, according to a letter from Miller to Marshall, one of initial organization in 
which assembling a staff and balancing educational quotients with commercial aesthetics led to a 
high turnover of participants.
27
 However, the second year helped to develop the scaffolding of an 
educational approach to mass-audience programming. Though progress was uneven and 
scattered, it was not Marshall who pulled the plug on the experiment. By the third year Miller 
was receiving “less and less help from members of the faculty except for the few who serve on 
Council committees and take part in the Council’s programs.”28 The result was that his bosses at 
the University of Chicago—Robert Hutchins and William Benton—wrote to Marshall that a 
large uncooperative consortium of local broadcasters would be difficult to execute and that the 
university no longer wanted to support the project. 
However, Benton wrote in another letter that one program that predated the UBC showed 
a great deal of promise: the University of Chicago Roundtable. While he felt that the UBC 
signaled a “fledgling approach,” Benton did remain optimistic that in spite of the general 
propensity for UBC programs to be “of mediocre quality due to lackadaisical faculty interest,” 
that the Roundtable provided a new educational genre in which experts discussed “world events 
and the specificities of their findings.”29 The Roundtable ran for twenty-two years and became 
the standard format for later political shows, as well as public broadcasting news interview 
formats. Even more interestingly, Robert Hutchins and William Benton’s interest in radio had 
been piqued. Benton went on to become a Connecticut Senator and one of the great champions 
of noncommercial broadcasting in 1950s regulatory debates that preceded public broadcasting, 
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and later became the head of UNESCO’s international broadcasting initiatives. Robert Hutchins 
consequently continued to work with educational broadcasters until 1959 as Associate Director 
of the Ford Foundation, which funded educational broadcasting after the RF moved on to other 
projects in the early 1950s. Unfortunately for Miller this was the end of the UBC, but his 
experiment inspired other educators to pursue fundamental goals around infrastructure, best 
practices, and consistency of content to rival commercial broadcasts.  
 
Regionalism—The Rocky Mountain Radio Council 
In 1937 A.G. Crane, President of the University of Wyoming, proposed a similar project 
to the University Broadcast Council of Chicago, which he called the Rocky Mountain Radio 
Council.
30
 Crane already had extensive experience with educational broadcasting, having worked 
for the Payne Fund of Ohio and its activist moniker the National Committee on Education by 
Radio (NCER). Crane envisioned a wider radius of broadcasting than localism, proposing that a 
multi-state consortium centered in Colorado and Wyoming create a regional broadcasting 
initiative in which widely separated populations would have access to the same free education. 
He noted that the UBC had served a small if populous region, and had hoped to extend the same 
concept to a wider, less populous, mountainous region. Marshall responded in a April 13, 1937 
letter that Crane was perhaps being a little too ambitious and not practical with his proposal to 
reach such a wide radius, as no technical infrastructure had yet been built and commercial 
telephone wire rentals were few and far between in that area. “Crane tended to assume that 
educators are already prepared for effective work in broadcasting.”31 However, Crane had 
already gained the support of quite a few local organizations, and the allure of trying a similar 
educational project with a multi-state audience, as well as the support of public land-grant 
universities and connected state departments led Marshall to support the project. It was an 
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ambitious initiative. Crane had not only proposed an experiment in educational radio 
regionalism, but had also hoped to increase the technological development of radio technology 
itself, while creating a sustainable supplementary teaching aid via radio, as conceived and 
coordinated through multiple institutions and associations separated by vast expanses of land.  
In a September 21, 1938 letter, Crane wrote a preliminary plan for broadcasting services 
in which he listed his objective as follows: “The Rocky Mountain Radio Council is proposing to 
establish an organization and facilities for producing cooperatively a public radio program to be 
known as the Rocky Mountain Public Program.”32 The program planned to broadcast on 
commercial stations through rented wire time, similar to the UBC. However, the organizational 
arrangement was more sophisticated and advanced than the UBC. Crane had arranged for 
“listening schools”33 to be fixed with radio sets, be supplied with listening and curricular 
instructions, and to respond to broadcasts with suggestions. Further, Crane was responsible for 
implementation of the first major innovation, later taken up by the important advocates that 
successfully lobbied for the Public Broadcasting Act, the National Association of Educational 
Broadcasters: the pressing of records of quality recorded shows to be broadcast at convenient 
times for each participating station.
34
 Also of interest, due to the initiative’s regional nature, 
placement among public land-grant institutions, and attempt to qualify educational broadcasting 
as “public interest” programming, Crane began using the term “public broadcasting”35 to 
describe the RMRC’s plan. This appears to be the first institutional usage of the term, broached 
multiple times in letters to Marshall, who recorded the term in his personal diaries. 
 The RMRC was an early success for regional distribution. Similar to the UBC, the first 
couple of years were shaky and largely comprised of accumulating and training staff, but by 
1940 the Council had accumulated active participation from twenty-seven institutions including 
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all of the regional universities, and was successfully broadcasting over fourteen distinct radio 
stations.
36
 Crane was in part successful because he began logistics so crucial to sustainable 
administration. In a July 22, 1939 letter he wrote: “The plan is remarkably simple. It is nothing 
more or less than the proposal for cooperation, first between producers of social broadcasts and 
second between the producers and transmitters of the programs. The plan provides the machinery 
for united, collective effort.”37 Crane felt that the initiative was subsequently adaptable to other 
stations and networks. Having worked first as an activist for educational broadcasting before 
1934, and then as a university president, Crane was in a serendipitous position to conceive a 
sustainable educational “network” that still maintained fidelity to fundamental civic goals and 
educational philosophies. RMRC broadcasts were approached as experiments for the purpose of 
increasing the general quality of educational radio best practices, later to serve as an example for 
other institutions. Instead of a city-based consortium, the Council had also incorporated twelve 
regional schools to coordinate and cooperate toward the creation and improvement of 
educational broadcasting. The radius of broadcasts was largely centered in Colorado and 
Wyoming, but programs also reached parts of Nebraska, Kansas, and New Mexico.  
Like the UBC, the project was subject to a combination of external interferences previous 
to 1940. In 1939 Crane came down with a protracted illness that stalled several initiatives. 
Around that time Marshall sent Robert Hudson of the Adult Education Council of Denver (and 
later CBS, the National Educational Television Research Center, and the Communication 
department at the University of Illinois) to monitor the quality of programming.
38
 When a 
negative review returned, Marshall temporarily cut off funding for the project. Crane appealed to 
Marshall for a smaller grant for continuation, by which time Marshall looked to Paul Lazarsfeld, 
professor at Columbia University and RF funded radio researcher, for a professional analysis. 
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Lazarsfeld was skeptical that a centralized “network” that manufactured educational records 
could act as an efficient counterpoint to commercial broadcasting. However, he lauded Crane’s 
unusual ability to successfully coordinate the first operating educational infrastructure to include 
distribution and manufacturing.
39
 That such an infrastructure worked, led to renewed interest by 
Marshall under the condition that measurement metrics be taken of the curricular success of 
specific programs. Crane had created a consistent mode of production in which most affiliated 
stations were playing the same programming to regional “public” listenership. Meanwhile, 
Robert Hudson was appointed to replace Crane as director of the RMRC, and due to his 
relationship with Marshall, support was extended. By 1940 the RMRC had produced thirty-two 
programs in eight continuous series, and broadcast one hundred and nine times over its thirteen 
affiliates.
40
 
 Upon receiving a second wave of RF funding in 1940, Hudson expanded services to 
include divisions of workshop centers in which studio auditoriums would be available for 
educational listenership. He also set up a trained, experienced, public relations center on behalf 
of the Council. However, due to internal politics, A.G. Crane was ousted as president of the 
University of Wyoming in 1941. Robert Hudson’s working relationship with Marshall began his 
prominent career in the educational broadcasting movement. Crane’s career did not end there 
though, and he went on to become governor of the state of Wyoming. The RMRC, which during 
WW II became a crucial site for the dissemination of official governmental information to the 
region, disbanded in 1950.  
 
National Broadcasting—The Office of Education 
Among serendipitous events in 1934, John Studebaker, the Superintendent of Des Moines 
public schools, was appointed U.S. Commissioner of Education and was tasked with overseeing 
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the development of federal initiatives related to educational broadcasting for the Department of 
the Interior. He commenced the first federal investment in electric education under the Federal 
Radio Education Committee (FREC) while working in concert with land-grant universities for 
noncommercial broadcasting advocacy. Together federal and state-based educators founded a 
successful campaign that subsequently worked as the National Association of Educational 
Broadcasters until the 1980s. Studebaker viewed radio as an important technological extension 
of national educational initiatives such as town-hall meetings called “public forums,”41 as well as 
general civic and curricular programming.  
Upon arrival at the Office of Education (OOE), which directly preceded the 
Communications Act, Studebaker noted both the lack of channels available to the OOE, as well 
as the contrast between radio and the classroom regarding coherent standards for educational 
broadcasting practice and administration. Studebaker turned to Marshall to underwrite federal 
investment in educational broadcasting research. Since the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) had been recently created to regulate private investment in technology, with 
no stipulations for public service, little money could be set aside for Studebaker’s FREC. Such 
funding would have been seen as a conflict of interest with recent federal policies. Hence, in 
1936 Studebaker’s office applied for several grants from the RF. His application noted that their 
request was designed to “enlist” radio broadcasting as an instrument for education.42 Under the 
umbrella of the FREC, Studebaker increased communication between hundreds of educational, 
independent, and commercial broadcasting stations, a number of national educational 
organizations, and the FCC, toward the nationalization of noncommercial broadcasting. 
Studebaker intended to aid in the “development of educational programs in the fields of science, 
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history, current affairs, and social studies, and a technique of distribution in collaboration with 
public education authorities.”43  
In practice the FREC was an unusual composite of radio interests—the FCC, educational, 
advocacy, philanthropic, and even commercial organizations were among those represented on 
the council, all with an eye for the improvement of educational broadcasting. While due to 
frequency scarcity, commercial interests had strongly lobbied against educators previous to 
1934, the unexpected result was that the networks felt burdened by stipulations in the 
Communications Act that networks produce “sustaining” programming to carry the slack of 
educational stations that no longer existed. For this the networks turned to Studebaker to locate 
what programs would be deemed valuable and sought to collaborate with the OOE toward the 
production of documentary and classroom programming. 
With RF grants Studebaker organized three conferences between 1934 and 1939 and 
began the first educational radio clearing house for OOE approved scripts.
44
 The FREC was 
further successful in uniting different interests in common discourse, and this influenced the 
newly constituted Federal Communications Commission to favor progress toward educational 
frequencies. As mentioned above, the FCC had been formed in 1934 as an outcome of the 
Communication Act, and its primary goal was to regulate technological research and frequency 
allocations. As federal technocrats FCC employees did not stand against noncommercial 
interests, though they were compelled to require broadcasts to follow standards of regulation. 
The FREC began to work with the FCC to study frequency availability for educational 
broadcasts. Their research noted ample airtime available for educational programming. 
Optimistic for the capacity for educators to gain more stations, they released a joint document 
stating that the goal of the project would be to “eliminate controversy and misunderstanding 
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between groups of educators and between the industry and educators,” as well as “promote 
actual cooperative arrangements between educators and broadcasters.” Subsequent FCC 
commissioners contributed (in varying degrees) to the delegation of frequencies for schools and 
universities.
45
 
FREC’s wide connectivity among players in the radio industry soon snowballed into 
several important steps toward the creation of the scaffolding for a national noncommercial 
approach. Identifying sixteen initiatives, the FREC applied for and received $168,620 in RF 
funds toward addressing problems of educational broadcasting methods and administration.
46
 
These initiatives included studies of difficulties by educators in using the radio medium, 
cooperation between states and regional broadcasters, school broadcasts, the training of station 
managers, and a study of the effects of broadcasts upon adults and children. In a tepid sign of 
support the commercial advocate, the National Association of Broadcasters, donated $27,000 to 
the FREC for educational development.
47
 These investments led to the creation of several 
initiatives in the promotion of educational broadcasting, especially the difficult task of creating a 
sustainable organizational standard and a distribution center for programs.  
 In line with documentation as early as October 1935, the OOE planned to promote a 
federal base for educational broadcasting, detailed in the document: “What the Office of 
Education Can Do.”48 In the proposal the OOE proposed to  
“assemble checking committees and other administrative responsibilities, mimeograph 
sample copies of scripts to be sent out on a mailing list for those groups requesting the 
service, prepare and distribute suggestions for proper production of the scripts, try out the 
scripts under the supervision of production and music directors, write and arrange 
necessary music, and carry necessary overhead for early production, including line rental, 
heat, light, stationary, etc.”49  
 
Many of these initiatives merely mimicked the Office of Education’s extant services for school 
districts. So it was not a difficult transition for the FREC to imagine and then create a national 
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clearinghouse for quality educational scripts and curricular goals, shipped for small fees to 
universities and school districts. That such large federal and philanthropic institutions were 
working together on this project piqued the interest of other institutions from the Carnegie 
Corporation to William Paley at CBS, who began to work with Studebaker and FCC chairmen 
E.O. Sykes and Anning Prall.
50
 
 As stated above, these initiatives led to a series of conferences about the direction to take 
with noncommercial media. In the second of three large FREC conferences in 1937, for example, 
Studebaker spoke to the problem of reconciling public and private interests for the purposes of 
democratic public control of radio. While the Communications Act had labeled all broadcasting 
approaches with such a perspective as “propaganda,” including educational broadcasts, the 1937 
conference compelled the FCC to amend the Act. Stating that “it is impossible to determine the 
character or value of a broadcast merely by its origin or sponsorship,” FCC representatives 
motioned toward mutual cooperation between educators and gatekeepers.
51
 This led to the FCC 
proposition that “educators engaged in broadcasting are to be given a better understanding of the 
industry’s methods for periods of three to six months.”52 The RF funded a comprehensive study 
program in promotion of FREC initiatives, and NAEB educators were directed to various 
apprenticeships and internships with the networks to study program production and 
administration. The FCC noted that educators had known “relatively little of listener interests on 
which broadcasting has to build,” and that educators could not rely “upon their judgment of 
weighing these factors in broadcasting without some surer knowledge of them.”53 Studebaker’s 
technocratic facilitation between the OOE, FCC, networks, educators, and Marshall, proved to be 
a fundamentally crucial occasion toward the realization of a federal wing of noncommercial 
broadcasting. Subsequently, educators structured their approaches to best practices around a 
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hybrid mix of network administration, office of education organization and standards, and appeal 
to FCC standards for meeting the criteria of the public interest, while developing core curricular 
goals for radio.  
 I wish to thank the rigorous staff of the Rockefeller Archive Center, especially archivist 
Nancy Adgent, who was generous with her professional advice and personal time, Thomas 
Rosenbaum for his helpful knowledge of Rockefeller history, and Erwin Levold and Judy Russo 
for their useful editing suggestions. 
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